it's where you're going
it's not what you're dreaming
but what you're gonna do
it's not where you're born
it's where you belong
it's not how weak
but what will make you strong
if i were to dig up aladdin's lamp my first wish would be for wisdom, so as not to regret the ensuing wishes.
"i am a stranger in this land, as you know," said she at length. "whence i come it matters not; but i have left those behind me with whom my fate was intimately bound, and from whom i am cut off forever. there is a weight in my bosom that i cannot away with, and i have come hither to inquire of their welfare."
"seeum lil one-piece smoke-boat; him come chop-chop."
i defy you to walk a couple of yards anywhere in paris without stumbling on some infernal complication.
the will flashes from the eye, as rays of light from the sun. such a look, mesmerizers say, penetrates to the person on whom it is directed.
other children might be guided by the fear of anger and the desire of approbation; but neither the one nor the other had any effect upon these.
now for this charme, that i told you of: you must bring a peece
of silver on the tip of your tongue, or no ferry: then, if it be
your chance to come where the blessed spirits, as ther's a sight
now--we maids that have our lyvers perish'd, crakt to peeces with
love, we shall come there, and doe nothing all day long but picke
flowers with proserpine; then will i make palamon a nosegay; then
let him marke me,--then--
finally, if there be still persons who are not sufficiently persuaded of
the existence of god and of the soul, by the reasons i have adduced, i am
desirous that they should know that all the other propositions, of the
truth of which they deem themselves perhaps more assured, as that we have
a body, and that there exist stars and an earth, and such like, are less
certain; for, although we have a moral assurance of these things, which is
so strong that there is an appearance of extravagance in doubting of their
existence, yet at the same time no one, unless his intellect is impaired,
can deny, when the question relates to a metaphysical certitude, that
there is sufficient reason to exclude entire assurance, in the observation
that when asleep we can in the same way imagine ourselves possessed of
another body and that we see other stars and another earth, when there is
nothing of the kind. for how do we know that the thoughts which occur in
dreaming are false rather than those other which we experience when awake,
since the former are often not less vivid and distinct than the latter?
and though men of the highest genius study this question as long as they
please, i do not believe that they will be able to give any reason which
can be sufficient to remove this doubt, unless they presuppose the
existence of god. for, in the first place even the principle which i have
already taken as a rule, viz., that all the things which we clearly and
distinctly conceive are true, is certain only because god is or exists and
because he is a perfect being, and because all that we possess is derived
from him: whence it follows that our ideas or notions, which to the extent
of their clearness and distinctness are real, and proceed from god, must
to that extent be true. accordingly, whereas we not infrequently have ideas
or notions in which some falsity is contained, this can only be the case with
such as are to some extent confused and obscure, and in this proceed from
nothing (participate of negation), that is, exist in us thus confused because
we are not wholly perfect. and it is evident that it is not less repugnant
that falsity or imperfection, in so far as it is imperfection, should proceed
from god, than that truth or perfection should proceed from nothing. but if
we did not know that all which we possess of real and true proceeds from a
perfect and infinite being, however clear and distinct our ideas might be,
we should have no ground on that account for the assurance that they possessed
the perfection of being true.